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This report does not reflect the official views of the governments of Kazakhstan, the United States, or any affiliated institutions. These findings are based on our own observations, interviews, and discussions conducted during the delegation’s visit to Kazakhstan. It is not an academic study but a field-based trip report that summarizes impressions and offers practical recommendations to strengthen ongoing reforms and encourage further progress.
At the invitation of the Government of Kazakhstan, a delegation was formed to assess the current state of religious freedom and social cohesion in the country. The delegation was led by Mr. Wade Kusack, Founder and President of Love Your Neighbor Community (LYNC). The members of the delegation: Dr. Chris Seiple, LYN Community Senior Fellow; Dr. Mohamed Elsanousi, Executive Director for the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers; Mr. Greg Mitchell, Founder and CEO for IRF Secretariat. Dr. Elsanousi traveled in his personal capacity and not as USCIRF Commissioner.
The delegation jointly visited Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent from 13–22 September 2025, meeting with senior officials from the Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA), religious leaders, and local multifaith clubs. Additional visits to Aktobe, Atyrau, and Aktau were conducted separately by Wade Kusack, and all references to findings in these cities in this report are based solely on his observations and interviews conducted during his visit to the latter cities.
The government covered all in-country costs, underscoring its openness to transparent evaluation. The members of the delegation met whomever they wanted publicly or privately.
The assessment focused on four contexts and their interaction:
This assessment was conducted within the “builders approach”2—an engagement model emphasizing cooperation and partnership over confrontation. Rather than criticizing from a distance, this approach builds relationships from within, providing suggestions to governments and societies as they navigate religious freedom reform.
The builders’ approach ensures that engagement occurs in mutual respect, contextual understanding, and shared responsibility—prioritizing sustainable progress toward religious freedom or belief and cultivation of positive linkages between religious freedom, long-term stability, and social cohesion.
The delegation’s goal was to better understand the factors shaping the religious landscape and current challenges to advancing religious freedom, and to propose practical steps for steady, long-term progress.
Kazakhstan’s approach to religion has been shaped by a century of control, repression, and, in very few instances, gradual renewal.
During the Russian Imperial era, religion was not only a matter of faith but also a tool of assimilation. For many ethnic Kazakhs and other Central Asian peoples, the Christianization policies of the empire symbolized a form of cultural domination. As one unregistered church leader in Shymkent reflected during our visit, “Negativity toward religion dates back to the Russian Empire—oppression was carried out by Christians. For many, Jesus became seen as a Russian god with different Easter egg colors that suppressed our own identity.”
This historical memory—of religion being used as an instrument of political and cultural control— still lingers in the collective consciousness. It has contributed to both the state’s cautious approach to religious activity and society’s sensitivity to external religious influence.
Under the Soviet regime (1920s–1991), the repression intensified. The state sought to eradicate all religions as part of its campaign for atheistic modernization. Mosques, churches, and seminaries 3 were closed; clergy were imprisoned or executed; and expressions of faith were systematically suppressed. By the 1970s, religion had been largely driven underground—surviving mostly as folk customs and cultural traditions, rather than as thoughtfully developed theologies.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it revealed a profound spiritual vacuum. Decades of stateenforced atheism had disrupted the natural transmission of religious knowledge and development of religious educational institutions, leaving many citizens with sincere spiritual curiosity but limited grounding in theology. Into this open space came a wide spectrum of religious influences—some constructive and community-building, others less transparent or more aggressive.
Although the 1990s were marked by a period of broad religious freedom, by the mid-2000s, the government had grown increasingly alarmed by the spread of extremist influences. It is important to note that government officials themselves were also vulnerable during this period. Their lack of understanding of the wide variety of religious influences, including those of non-traditional faith communities, was also a contributing factor. So, they were alarmed by extremist influences and non-traditional communities they did not understand.
By the late 2000s, a series of terrorist incidents and extremist infiltrations prompted the government to do what they had learned from the Soviet time to do—adopt a more securitized approach, culminating in the 2011 Law on Religious Activity and Religious Associations, which tightened registration and monitoring procedures3 and reduced the number of recognized religious communities—cutting roughly in half those previously registered, including many peaceful nontraditional groups such as Scientology and small Protestant communities. These measures, though restrictive, reflected the state’s attempt to prevent chaos in an environment still learning to balance freedom with responsibility. (LYNC first visited Kazakhstan at this time (2013), and it was not possible to have the conversations that this assessment reports.)
While these measures helped contain extremist activity in the short run, they also constrained the growth of smaller peaceful faith communities. In practice, the same restrictive tools used against extremists were sometimes applied to individuals and groups who posed no threat. This created feelings of antagonism, frustration, and distrust toward the government among peaceful believers—especially those who were unable to practice their faith openly or demonstrate their positive contributions to society. Although only a small percentage of those affected became radicalized, the broader impact was an increase in alienation and resentment, which can itself undermine long-term security and social cohesion.
After 2015, however, a shift began. Local authorities were given more responsibility for managing religious affairs through regional Departments of Religious Affairs. This made implementation of 4 the law more context-sensitive and responsive to community realities. Local officials, religious leaders, and NGOs began to build direct relationships, creating the conditions for dialogue and gradual liberalization.
An even greater shift happened when President Tokayev assumed his current position in 2019, articulating the vision of a “listening state.” According to numerous conversations conducted during this assessment, this concept signaled a new phase in government–religious relations. Before 2019, many religious groups were viewed primarily through a security lens, often regarded as potential threats. Under the new administration, however, the religious climate changed markedly. Authorities began to meet regularly with religious representatives, solicit their opinions, and include them in joint programs and public initiatives.
Mr. Alexey Kildyshov, Deputy Chair for the Biblical Center New Life, Almaty, described this transformation succinctly: “Before, the government responded with penalties; now we receive warnings. The most important change is the atmosphere itself—today, we feel no threat. The government wants to hear from us and invites us to contribute.”
An evangelical pastor from Aktau shared his personal story: he had been detained and fined seven times for conducting “unregistered religious activity” prior to 2019. “Now,” he said, “I sit with everyone else to discuss religious affairs and social issues in our city.”
Religious freedom is not only a human right—it is a cornerstone of national security and social stability. When religious leaders are free to practice their faith and engage openly in dialogue within the public sphere, they become valuable partners in preventing conflict, countering radicalization, and strengthening community resilience.
Kazakhstan faces persistent threats from transnational extremist groups (including ISIS-K) that seek to exploit economic hardship and digital platforms to radicalize youth across Central Asia.4 Government officials described a multi-tiered system of prevention that combines intelligence monitoring, civil-society engagement, and theological outreach.
In Aktobe (in Western Kazakhstan), for example, 120 local specialists monitor online content for radical material. The Kazakh NGOs and imams work together to intervene early—through counseling, mentoring, or education—before law enforcement becomes involved. This proactive This assessment was conducted within the “builders approach”ii—an engagement model emphasizing cooperation and partnership over confrontation. Rather than criticizing from a distance, this approach builds relationships from within, providing suggestions to governments and societies as they navigate religious freedom reform.
The builders’ approach ensures that engagement occurs in mutual respect, contextual understanding, and shared responsibility—prioritizing sustainable progress toward religious freedom or belief and cultivation of positive linkages between religious freedom, long-term stability, and social cohesion.
The delegation’s goal was to better understand the factors shaping the religious landscape and current challenges to advancing religious freedom, and to propose practical steps for steady, long-term progress.5
Kazakhstan’s landmark initiative, Operation Zhusan, remains one of the most humanitarian and successful repatriation programs in the world. Since 2019, hundreds of women and children have been brought home from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. The government treats them first of all as victims of manipulation, and then considers whether they were involved in criminal activities.
During the visit to Atyrau, Wade Kusack met with the wives of former ISIS fighters, now attending/working in rehabilitation centers. Their testimonies revealed the devastating psychological and social consequences of extremism, but also the transformative impact of Kazakhstan’s compassionate reintegration model. Each woman receives counseling, vocational training, and theological guidance to rebuild her life within society. Some of the women met during this assessment had received prison sentences for their roles in recruiting other women to join ISIS, or for bringing their children into conflict zones where those children tragically perished in Syria or Iraq.6
The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war has tested Kazakhstan’s diplomatic independence and its longstanding “multi-vector” foreign policy. While maintaining necessary trade and security ties with Moscow, Kazakhstan has deliberately avoided endorsing Russian aggression, instead positioning itself as a proponent of constructive diplomacy, sovereignty, and international law.
At the same time, China’s expanding economic and political footprint has created both opportunities and vulnerabilities. Chinese investments in infrastructure and energy have bolstered 6 national development, yet they also raise concerns about dependency, strategic leverage, and influence over domestic narratives.
Both Russia and China continue to seek influence within Kazakhstan’s internal affairs for their own purposes, including in the sphere of religion. Russia’s ongoing “anti-cult” campaigns, led by figures such as Alexander Dvorkin, have historically targeted minority faiths under the guise of protecting “traditional values.” These narratives have at times influenced public and policy discourse in neighboring states, including Kazakhstan, by stigmatizing smaller religious groups and complicating interfaith relations.
Similarly, China’s internal security paradigm—particularly its fear of separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang—has shaped its regional approach to religion, promoting tight state control and surveillance of religious expression. Such perspectives risk influencing broader Central Asian policy debates about security, extremism, and religious regulation. As one participant from the Almaty multi-faith club emphasized, “All of these things have to be discussed together, and it is critically important to include civil society in such discussions.”
In this complex geopolitical environment, Kazakhstan’s government continues to balance competing pressures by reinforcing its sovereignty, making positive amendments in its existing religious freedom policies, and engaging diverse international partners. Its goal is to remain a bridge between East and West, advancing President Tokayev’s vision of Kazakhstan as a “middle power that builds peace through dialogue,” while safeguarding its internal stability and the autonomy of its religious and civic institutions.
Kazakhstan’s global identity is increasingly tied to its multi-faith diplomacy. The Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, held triennially in Astana, positions Kazakhstan as a global convenor for dialogue among civilizations. The 2025 Congress featured speeches from religious leaders across Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism, as well as international organizations such as the OSCE and UN.
Kazakhstan became a unique place where, behind the same roundtable, one could see the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, the top leadership of the Anglican Church, a Jerusalem Rabbi, and Iranian Ayatollahs.
President Tokayev’s addresses reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s commitment to “unity in diversity, tolerance, and trust” as the foundations of both domestic policy and foreign relations. He warned 7 against the rise of religious nationalism and called on faith leaders to act as moral compasses in a turbulent world.7
While the Congress continues to showcase Kazakhstan’s global leadership in interreligious dialogue, it would gain even greater legitimacy and inclusiveness by expanding participation to include non-traditional faiths, which are currently excluded. It is worth noting that Greg Mitchell, a member of this delegation, who chairs the IRF Roundtable in Washington, D.C., has been involved in the cooperative and constructive engagement since May 2013, and has made several trips to Kazakhstan—including five different cities—to build relationships and trust, was not invited to the Congress.
Religious freedom is not only a human right—it is a cornerstone of national security and social stability. When religious leaders are free to practice their faith and engage openly in dialogue within the public sphere, they become valuable partners in preventing conflict, countering radicalization, and strengthening community resilience.
In Kazakhstan, this principle is increasingly evident through the establishment of multi-faith clubs, which exemplify the practical link between religious freedom and security. These clubs create safe spaces where representatives of various registered religious communities can meet regularly to discuss not only interreligious relations but also the broader social challenges affecting their cities and regions. The multi-faith clubs are currently restricted the participation of non-registered religious communities.
In Almaty, for instance, the local multi-faith club has evolved beyond mere discussion of theological or administrative issues. It has become a forum for addressing pressing societal concerns—including online radicalization, domestic violence, youth disengagement, and environmental responsibility—while seeking actionable, community-based solutions. Through collaborative projects, such as city clean-up campaigns, participation in public marathons, and visits to each other’s places of worship, these religious leaders model unity and shared responsibility in the public eye.
Importantly, multi-faith clubs could play a role in creating a structured pathway for inclusion—a process through which peaceful, non-registered religious communities may begin to engage with the state and other faith groups. These clubs could invite such communities to participate initially as observers, allowing them to gradually build relationships, demonstrate transparency, and contribute 8 to joint civic initiatives. Over time, this step-by-step approach would help foster mutual understanding, respect, and trust, laying the groundwork for inclusion and equal citizenship.
This model would benefit both sides: government authorities would gain a clearer picture of Kazakhstan’s diverse religious landscape and identify reliable, community-minded partners, while religious communities would gain opportunities to show their peaceful intent, civic responsibility, and commitment to the nation’s shared values. In this way, the multi-faith clubs could become a practical mechanism for bridging regulation with relationship—transforming inclusion from a policy aspiration into a lived experience.
Improvements
January 2025 amendments to Article 490 of the Administrative Code halved fines for religion-related offenses, removed automatic deportations, and introduced official warnings as alternative sanctions.
Kazakhstan’s courts ruled: – In favor of a Jehovah’s Witness conscientious objector9 and – Protected schoolgirls’ right to education even when wearing hijabs, indicating a more balanced interpretation of the law.
Multi-Faith Clubs are now being initiated in multiple cities, across the whole country, providing regular forums for religious leaders and government officials to collaborate on social and security issues.
Operation Zhusan evolved into a model humanitarian program that focuses on rehabilitation, theological counseling, and social reintegration of women and children repatriated from Syria and Iraq.
Officials increasingly rely on education and dialogue rather than penalties, with some religious leaders reporting a climate of safety and cooperation unseen before 2019.
Through direct observation and dialogue, the delegation concluded that many restrictive practices identified by previous reports reflect residual patterns of Soviet-era governing structure— bureaucratic caution, excessive control, and low trust between state and society.
These legacies are gradually fading, replaced by more transparent and cooperative approaches. The shift from penalties to warnings, the creation of multi-faith clubs, and the willingness of authorities to engage in open discussions all indicate progress toward a systemic transformation. 9
Our delegation’s findings suggest a number of priorities for continued improvement:
We recommend that Kazakhstan continue modernizing its legal framework to reflect trust-based governance rather than control, and progress toward harmonization with international legal standards. This includes:
a) Simplifying the registration process by reducing the minimum membership requirement.
b) Easing procedures for foreign missionary approval and the circulation of religious literature.
c) Address the hijab issue through sustained dialogue that respects both the secular framework and the right to manifest belief.
d) To clearly distinguish between prosecutable extremist activity—which threatens public safety—and non-violent expressions of belief or radical thought that can be addressed through education, dialogue, and other forms of constructive engagement.
Broaden space for independent moderate Islamic scholarship beyond the single school of thought, which is adopted by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan.
Establish oversight mechanisms to investigate alleged abuses by law enforcement in religion-related cases.
a) The Multi-Faith Clubs model11, already successful in Almaty, should be expanded nationwide as community-based trust-building platforms. These Clubs could serve as a platform for positive engagement of not-yet-registered religious communities. These clubs could invite such communities to participate initially as observers, allowing them to gradually build relationships, demonstrate transparency, and contribute to joint civic initiatives. Over time, this step-by-step approach would help foster mutual understanding, respect, and trust, laying the groundwork for eventual membership and formal registration.
b) Establishing a Kazakhstan Religious Freedom and Social Cohesion Secretariat (building on the IRF Secretariat model) would ensure continuity and engagement with the IRF Secretariat global network.
c) Embedding Cross-Cultural Religious Literacy (CCRL) into Kazakhstan’s national education and governance systems—particularly within civil service training, law enforcement academies, and university-level programs—would provide officials, 10 educators, and community leaders with the competencies needed to navigate religious diversity constructively. Institutionalizing CCRL would strengthen preventive approaches to extremism, enhance public trust, and reinforce cooperative engagement as a national norm.
Developing multi-faith pilgrimage and cultural routes highlighting Kazakhstan’s Islamic, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, and Nestorian heritage would strengthen international understanding, generate economic benefits, and reinforce the country’s image as a bridge of civilizations.
Across their collective experience over the years, the delegation has observed the evolution from control toward cooperation and the growing inclusion of religious communities in policy dialogue. Kazakhstan’s path forward lies in consolidating this culture of “soft engagement” into durable institutions of trust. Achieving this will require not only continued government openness but also sustained attention from international and domestic partners to ensure that progress in spirit is matched by freedom in practice.
Kazakhstan stands at a pivotal moment in its modern history. Its steady progress toward ensuring religious freedom, constructive diplomacy, and pluralistic governance demonstrates that national stability and religious diversity can coexist.
The government’s decision to invite international partners for open assessment and its cooperation with civil society organizations like LYNC have become good practices in Central Asia. If Kazakhstan continues on this path—simplifying restrictive laws, eliminating unnecessary regulations, deepening dialogue, and embedding Cross-Cultural Religious Literacy into its national education and governance systems—it can serve as a regional and global model for peaceful coexistence and human dignity in a pluralistic world.